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INTRODUCTION
Functional claiming has been the issue at the heart of the software patent
problem.' Functional claiming is particularly problematic in software patents as
inventors may use them to broadly claim an entire goal instead of a particular
implementation. 2 The accumulation of such software patents has created a patent
1 See infra Part I.
2 Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 Wis.
L., REV. 905, 907.
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thicket, leading to their abuse by patent trolls, causing extended litigation, and
making it difficult for patent examiners to search through prior art. 3 Courts have
failed to offer a solution to reign in functional claiming, having "assiduously
avoided" the problematic software patent issue for over twenty-five years. 4 The
Supreme Court has indirectly addressed overbroad software patents by finding
patents invalid for indefiniteness when the patent's specification fails to provide
the scope of the invention as in Nautilus or for being abstract when process
patents merely apply an abstract idea using a generic computer implementation as
in Alice.5 These decisions, while a step in the right direction, do not address the
overall problem of functional claiming. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) has taken steps to provide expedited routes to enable third parties to
3 Id., at 920-928. The "patent thicket" as defined by Carl Shapiro and cited by Lemley is
the result of a "complex overlapping of patent rights that simply involves too many rights to
cut through." Products such as smartphones utilize an estimated amount of 250,000 patents.
This makes it not only expensive to innovate, but expensive to license. Additionally,
technology companies must deal with endless litigation brought on by patent trolls who own
such overbroad functional patents if they refuse to pay royalties. Companies also build up
patent portfolios for defensive purposes, resulting in a patent "arms race." This is expensive
as companies have spent $15-20 billion buying patents.
4 Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software
Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 4 (2001).
s See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014) (holding that
a patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the patent's specification
delineating the patent and prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those
skilled in the art about the scope of the invention"); Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International,
134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352 (2014) (reinforcing the Mayo framework that "merely requiring generic
computer implementation fails to transform [the] abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention"); see also Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289,
1294, 1296-98 (2012) (providing a twostep test (Mayo test) to determine if there's an
"inventive concept" and an element or combination of elements that is sufficient to transform
the process to significantly more than the abstract concept itself).
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challenge patent validity through post grant proceedings and inter partes review;
however, these procedures do not reform functional claiming. 6 In an effort to
address this problem, Professor Lemley has suggested reforming functional
claims by treating all functional software claims as means-plus-function claims. 7
Under § 112(f), this limits all functional claim elements to only the
implementations described in the specification.8
While seemingly simple, using § 112(f) to reform functional claiming is in
reality not so straightforward. Under § 112(f), only claims that contain the trigger
words "means for" will automatically invoke means-plus-function claiming.
Otherwise, claim interpretation is needed to construe a functional claim as a
means-plus-function claim, which lends itself to subjectivity and controversy. 9 To
make matters worse, there is a rebuttable presumption against the use of § 112(f)
if certain trigger words are not present. Coupled with the courts' unwillingness to
invoke § 112(f) absent the trigger word "means" or equivalent nonce words, this
makes the statute a difficult one to apply.10 As a result, automatically invoking §
112(f) may actually increase litigation instead of curtailing it, making § 112(f) an
imperfect mechanism for narrowing functional claims.
Given the difficulty in applying § 112(f), the nonobviousness doctrine may be
a better approach for weeding out overbroad functional patents." Under § 103,
6 37 C.F.R. Pt. 42 (2012) (established under the America Invents Act of 2011).
7 Lemley, supra note 2, at 915-917.
8 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012). See infra Part I.B.
9 See infra Part II.B.
10 Williamson v. Citrix Online LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
1 Id.
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claims that cover broad functionality are likely to be found obvious. 12 By
applying a nonobviousness filter, both the PTO and courts can more efficiently
weed out overbroad functional patents by focusing their attention on the merits of
the invention and the scope of claims instead of getting bogged down in
determining whether a claim meets the requisite structural elements of § 1 12(f) in
order to then narrow the claim through the statute. 13
This paper presents two phases for effectively tackling functional claims using
the nonobviousness doctrine. Pre-grant, the PTO may prevent new overbroad
claims from being issued. 14 Post grant, courts may invalidate or narrow functional
claims through pretrial claim construction hearings in order to eliminate
unnecessary litigation. 15 In order to allow courts to invalidate claims pretrial, the
Federal Circuit must reform its approach to allow courts to consider the inventive
contribution during claim construction. 16
Currently, the Federal Circuit has separated findings of fact, such as the
inventive contribution, from legal questions, such as claim construction. 17
However, without allowing courts to consider the inventive contribution, courts
will not be able to determine when to narrow claim scope. This initial step is
necessary in order for claims to be narrowed. Courts may better utilize the
nonobvious doctrine to invalidate claims pretrial once the Federal Circuit has
12 See infra Part III.A and Part IV.A.
13 See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2011); 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012).
14 See infra Part III.
1s See infra Part IV.
16 See infra Part IV.
17 Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 63 (1923).
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allowed them to consider underlying facts of the invention. 18 Similarly, in order
for Lemley's solution to work as intended, courts must first understand the
inventive contribution in order to effectively apply § 112(f) to tackle overbroad
software patent claims.
This paper considers methods for solving the functional claiming problem by
first analyzing the applicability of Lemley's solution and then providing an
alternative solution using nonobviousness to weed out overbroad functional
patents as early as possible both during prosecution and during litigation. Part I
presents the background of functional claiming under § 112(f), the issues with
functional claiming in software patents, and the controversial application of §
112(f) to claims not drafted in means-plus-function fonnat. Part II analyzes
Lemley's proposed solution to automatically apply § 112(f) to all software
functional claims and the benefits and drawbacks of his approach. Parts III and IV
present an alternative approach using the nonobviousness doctrine in two phases
to tackle functional claims. Part III discusses the first phase where the
nonobviousness doctrine is applied during prosecution to prevent functional
claims from being issued in the first place. The applicability of § 112(f) during
prosecution to narrow claims is also discussed. Part IV discusses the second phase
where the nonobviousness doctrine should be applied post grant during Markman
hearings to retroactively invalidate functional claims prior to trial. This section
discusses reforms the Federal Circuit must adopt in order to introduce
nonobviousness to pretrial hearings. Part IV also discusses the reforms the Federal
18 See id.; KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 413-15 (2007) (indicating that
because nonobviousness involves underlying questions of fact, it is therefore not considered
by the Federal Circuit during claim construction which happens prior to trial).
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Circuit must make in order to effectively employ § 112(f) as a viable solution to
restrict claims during claim construction.
I. BACKGROUND ON MEANS-PLUS-FUNCTION CLAIMING UNDER
§ 112(F)
A. Why Functional Claiming is a Problem in Software
Functional claiming has been a hotly debated area in software patents because
it allows entire genres of functionality being claimed instead of particular
implementations to accomplish those functions. 19 Lemley describes the problem
as patentees claiming to own the goal itself instead of the specific way to achieve
the goal. 20 In software, such functional claims are prevalent. 2 1 Because software is
inherently functional, it is designed to solve an abstract problem by breaking
down the problem into smaller, solvable functions. 22 Inevitably, claims in
software patents are thus functional in nature as they are written to protect the
functional innovations that the software provides. 23
While the patent system grants limited monopolies to patentees "to promote
19 Lemley, supra note 2, at 908.
20 Id. See Kevin Emerson Collins, Patent Law's Functionality Malfunction and the
Problem of Overbroad, Functional Software Patents, 90 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1399, 1402 (2013).
21 Collins, supra note 20, at 1444.
22 Colleen V. Chien, Comment to PTO-P-2012-0052/Request for Comments and Notice
of Roundtable Events for Partnership for Enhancement of Quality of Software-Related
Patents, 78 F.R. 292 (2013).
23 Collins, supra note 20, at 1444 (Collins claims that the nature of software inventions
being purely functional entities because there are "no relevant physical, structural properties
to grab onto and require as claim limitations").
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the Progress of Science and useful Arts," the Supreme Court has required
patentees to define clear boundaries of what it is exactly that patentees own to the
public.24 However, functional claiming has led patentees to claim broad
boundaries for their inventions, despite having only described a few
embodiments. 25 This enables patentees to block all current and future market
competition for a particular functionality, where any market substitute technology
that performs the same function as the patentee's would fall within the scope of
the functional claim. 26 From a social policy perspective, this is troubling because
patents are not designed to confer market monopolies. 27
One historic example of this is Morse's broad functional claim covering all
communications using electromagnetic means for printing characters at a
distance. 28 If Morse's claim had been valid, every modern day means for
communication through electromagnetic means, such as through the Internet,
computers, fax, etc. would have infringed his patent, although these technologies
had not yet been invented. Instead, Morse was appropriately awarded a narrower
claim for his particular implementation of the telegraph which constituted the
electromagnetic means for communication. 29
24 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002).
25 Collins, supra note 20, at 1444-45.
26 Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1946) (holding that
substituting broad language at the point of novelty does not provide sufficient notice of what
is being removed from the public domain).
27 Lemley, supra note 2, at 912.
28 O 'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 106 (1854).
29 Id. at 132.
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One argument against the threat of Morse securing a genre of technologies
with his broad claim is that his patent would have expired long before the
invention of modem day technologies, such as the Internet. Under this argument,
the dangers of broad software claims are mitigated by a limited patent term.
However, it is unforeseeable how quickly technology may develop. Although
Morse's patent may have expired long before the Internet was invented, it may
still have covered unanticipated, incremental innovations that were precursors to
the Internet. It is arguable that the invention of the Internet might have been
delayed had innovation been blocked by Morse's overbroad patent. While going
from telegraph to the Internet took over a century, in the modern era, software
innovation has grown at a more accelerated pace. 30 Particularly for software
technology, a twenty-year patent term may be quite long and encompass much
more innovation than Morse's patent would have covered in the same time span.
Rather than gamble on patent term expiration to weed out blocking patents, it is
more practical to restrict functional claiming when possible to promote
innovation. 3 1
30 Moore's law is a general rule that the number of transistors in an integrated circuit
doubles every two years. Moore's law describes a driving force of technological and social
change, where the approximate exponential growth of transistors has been loosely linked to
the growth of technology. Moore 's Law, WIKIPEDIA,
bi ps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moore%27s law (last visited Dec. 17, 2015).
31 See Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case
of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REv. 75, 80-81 (1994) (describing the blocking patent
phenomenon where an inventor may leverage a broad patent to prevent others from building
up his invention unless they take a license).
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B. Permissible Limited Functional Claiming Under § 112(f)
As problematic as functional claiming may be, it is not prohibited. Limited
functional claiming is permissible under the Patent Act of 1952, codified under 35
U.S.C § 112(f), which provides for means-plus-function claiming.3 2 § 112(f)
allows patentees to claim functionality without disclosing structure in the claim,
to the extent that such functional elements are limited to only the disclosed
structures described in the specification and any equivalents. 33 The statute §
112(f), states:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a
means or step for performing a specified function without the
recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such a
claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure,
material or acts described in the specification and equivalents
thereof. 34
For software functional patents, the statue restricts a functional claim to only
the disclosed algorithm used to implement that function. 35 Because an algorithm
describes a specific set of steps for achieving the general function claimed, courts
have considered algorithms to be the "metaphorical structure of a software
32 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012).
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int'1 Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir.
2008). See Lemley, supra, note 1, at 946-47; Collins, supra note 20, at 1447 (Collins claims
that courts have ported the invention-structure equation over to the software arts by "framing
algorithms as the metaphorical structures of software inventions and adopting a technology-
specific invention-algorithm equation").
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invention" used to limit the scope of functional claims. 3 6 Thus, § 112(f) provides
a mechanism to constrain functional claiming when invoked; however, outside the
reach of § 112(f), functional claiming remains unrestricted and problematic.
The problem with § 112(f) is that it is an opt-in statute.37 The Federal Circuit
has held that §112(f) applies "only to purely functional claims that do not provide
the corresponding structure that performs the recited function."38 Without the use
of "means for" or equivalent nonce words, there is a rebuttable presumption
against § 112(f). 39 Patentees avoid § 112(f) by showing that the element in
question is not functional or that the element is sufficiently described by structure
to avoid invoking the statute. 40 Because of this presumption, functional claiming
is particularly problematic in software patents, as patentees have intentionally
circumvented § 112(f) by cleverly associating functional elements with trivial
computer hardware to provide structure. 41 The following exemplary claim
illustrates this:
A method for unlocking a device using a touch screen comprising:
touching the screen along several points on the screen to indicate a
gesture, wherein the gesture matches the gesture previously stored in the
36 Collins, supra note 20, at 1447.
37 Lighting World, 382 F.3d, 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that if the term "means
for" is used, there is a presumption that section 112(f) applies, but the presumption is
rebuttable if sufficient structural limitations are specified).
38 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
39 Lighting World, 382 F.3d, at 1359-60.
40 Id.
41 Lemley, supra note 2, at 949-950.
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device as a password.
Here, a device is unlocked using a touch screen, but provides no indication of
how the unlocking is performed. Tying the method to a touch screen is
insufficient. Since software is designed to run on all types of hardware platforms,
referencing general-purpose computers and computer components to provide
structure does not contribute anything to the functionality of the claim.42 Thus,
patentees may cleverly bypass the limits of §112(f) by simply referencing
components of a computer as structure in the claim to obtain broad functional
claims without restriction to particular implementations. 43
The following exemplary claims from issued patents further illustrate how
clever patent drafting by tying the claim to generic computer components
sidesteps § 112(f):
"Computer readable program code configured to cause a computer to
[perform series of steps]." 44
"A method for locating online information comprising the steps of [various
steps not employing any hardware]." 45
"Software executing in the central processor to configure the processor so as
to [perform a series of functions]."46
In each of the above claims, the referenced structure consists either of trivial
4 2 Id. at 919.
43 Id. at 945-946.
44 U.S. Patent No. 5,878,400 col.23 11.22-23 (filed June 17, 1996) (emphasis added).
45 U.S. Patent No. 5,930,474 col.40 11.43-49 (filed Jan. 31, 1996) (emphasis added).
46 U.S. Patent No. 7,698,372 B2 col.43 11.53-54 (filed Sept. 28, 2009) (emphasis added).
Vol. 8 1
2016 A NONOBVIOUS WAY To FUNCTIONAL CLAIMING 13
hardware structure such as "computer" or "processor" or do not reference any
hardware at all. Furthermore, the nominal hardware structure not only avoids the
scope limitations of § 112(f), but also obscures the fact that the software
algorithm used to implement the functionality is missing. 47 As a result, each claim
is purely functional in describing the set of functions with no implementation
details disclosed in the claim language. 48
Recently, courts have started to apply § 112(f) more broadly by interpreting a
claim element as a means-plus-function element despite the lack of the trigger
word "means," if the element does not provide sufficiently definite structure. 49
However, arbitrary judicial subjectivity in claim interpretation and the lack of a
standard for defining a functional element have led to courts to apply § 112(f) to
software claims inconsistently.5 0 This controversial approach has led to increased
litigation when the presumption to invoke § 112(f) is rebutted, morphing § 112(f)]
"from a clear legal instruction into a litigator's delight."51 Despite these
complexities, Lemley's solution takes this approach a step further by
automatically applying § 112(f) to all functional software claims. 52
47 Lemley, supra note 2, at 923.
48 Id. at 930. See also Morse, 56 U.S. at 112.
49 Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1348.
50 Id. at 1362-3.
51 Id. (holding that there is a rebuttable presumption that § 112(f) is not applied if the
claim that does not use the "means for" term, but if structural limitations are not specified to
describe the means, the presumption may be rebutted). See also Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc.,
757 F.3d 1286, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
52 See infra Part II.
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II. ANALYSIS OF LEMLEY'S § 112(F) SOLUTION
A. Lemley's Solution to Automatically Apply § 112() to Functional Software
Claims
To address the software patent problem, Lemley advocates that "we must take
seriously the dictate of §112(f)" and treat all functional software claims as means-
plus-function claims under § 1 12(f).5 3 By automatically imposing § 112(f) on such
claims, Lemley pushes the court to adopt a broader application of § 112(f). Under
this approach, Lemley penalizes patentees, who try to achieve overbroad claims,
by automatically reading in the limitations of specification and equivalents thereof
into the claims to restrict each functional element. 54 Lemley claims that this will
leave the market open to allow later entrants to develop different algorithms that
may achieve the same goal.ss This approach is attractive, according to Lemley,
because no statutory modification is necessary, and courts may retroactively apply
the means-plus-function doctrine in order to address the software patent thicket. 56
B. Issues with Lemley's Approach
Although Lemley's proposal has become quite popular because of its
seemingly straightforward approach, Lemley has not fully explored the
difficulties that arise in the automatic application of § 112(f) to functional software
claims. Lemley acknowledges that for § 112(f) to be effective, "courts must resist
5 Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 Wis.
L. REV. 905, 947 (2012).
54 Id.
ss Id. at 955-956.
56 Id. at 948.
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the temptation to permit broad generic recitations of structure in a means-plus-
function claim." 57 However, he does not provide any guidance for determining
when a claim should be considered a means-plus-function claim. This makes his
solution difficult to apply.
Lemley's approach is premised on identifying claims containing functional
elements that lack corresponding structure.5 8 Thus to invoke § 112(f), functional
elements that do not specify structure must first be identified in the claim. Second,
the structure to implement the functional element must be missing or insufficient.
Claim interpretation at each of these two steps introduces controversy because the
standard for what constitutes a functional element and what is deemed sufficient
structure is unclear. 59 While Lemley recognizes that "courts and lawyers will
doubtless disagree over . . . what structure corresponds to any other functional
patent claim element" and "the level of in which the implementation should be
disclosed," he dismisses the issue as a general problem of patent scope. 6 0
i. Subjective Claim Interpretation Causes the Application of § 112(f) to be
Inconsistent
In order to utilize the statute, functional elements and acceptable structure
must be properly defined. Courts have struggled to determine what constitutes a
functional element and when computer elements are devoid of structure. 6 1 As a
57 Id. at 951.
ss id.
59 Williamson v. Citrix Online LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1351-52 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
6o Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 Wis.
L., REV. 905, 961 (2012).
61 See Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1348-49.
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result, courts have applied § 112(f) inconsistently and have presumed that
§ 112(f) does not apply when the patentee has not opted into means-plus-function
claiming. 62
The applicability of § 112(f) without the word "means" in the claim is
dependent on the use of functional elements comprising unmodified nonce words,
such as "module," "device," "mechanism," and "element," to trigger §112 (f). 63
The Federal Circuit held in Williamson that generic computer elements, such as
"module", "mechanism", "element", "device" and other "nonce words," "reflect
nothing more than verbal constructs" and should invoke § 112(f) because they do
not connote sufficiently definite structure. 64 However, despite this guidance, the
Federal Circuit has been unable to provide a consistent standard for what
constitutes a "nonce word." The Federal Circuit has inconsistently found claim
structure described as "a computer" or "a processor" or even "the Internet" to be
sufficient and allowed the broadly claimed function without triggering § 112(f). 6 5
62 Kevin Emerson Collins, Patent Law's Functionality Malfunction and the Problem of
Overbroad, Functional Software Patents, 90 WASH. U. L. REv. 1399, 1463 (2013) (stating
that when a patentee does not use a means-plus-function claim, "courts often find sufficient
structure in claim limitations to preclude the application of section 112(f) even when the
claim is in effect a purely functional claim"); see also Flo Healthcare Sols., LLC v. Kappos et
al, 697 F.3d 1367, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that it is up to the patentee to indicate if
she has elected to invoke § 112(f)).
63 Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1355-58 (Reyna, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(recognizing that the determination of whether nonce words trigger § 112(f) has caused
arbitrary judicial subjectivity and further pushed the issue into claim construction).
64 Id. at 1350 (quoting Mass. Inst. of Tech. & Elecs. for Imaging, Inc. v. Abacus Software,
462 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2006)); see generally MPEP § 2181 (2015).
6s SeeApple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1296-97 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (where
"processor" is not a generic nonstructural term such as "element", and "device" that typically
do not connote sufficient structure); Inventio AG v. ThyssenKrupp Elevator Ams. Corp., 649
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Outside the reach of § 1 12(f), the fundamental rule of patent claim construction
requires that claim terms are to encompass all general meanings of the term.66
Limitations, preferred embodiments, and specific examples from the written
description are not to be read into the claims. 67 Thus, until the courts determine
how to consistently identify functional software claims, claims drafted in this
ambiguous manner will continue to percolate into the world.
In the aftermath of Williamson, the court seems to still be forgiving of
borderline functional language(i.e., when "means" is not used but when modified
nonce words are used instead).6 8 To further complicate things, the Federal Circuit
F.3d 1350, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (where "computing unit" was sufficiently definite
structure that did not invoke § 112(f)); Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting , Inc., 382
F.3d, 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (where a term covering a broad class of structures and
identifies structures by their function is sufficient to avoid invoking § 112 (f)); In re Alappat,
33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (holding a general-purpose computer was a
new machine whenever it was programmed with new instructions which opened the door to
treating a programmed computer as physical structure rather than invoking § 112(f)).
However, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board has also found in some instances that claims that
only included a "processor" as structure invoked § 112(f)); see also Ex parte Smith, No.
2012-00763 1, slip op. at 3 (PTAB Mar. 14, 2013) ("processor programmed to"); Ex parte
Lakkala, No. 2011-001526, slip op. at 4 (PTAB Mar. 13, 2013) ("processor . .. configured
to"); Ex parte Errol, No. 2011-001143, slip op. at 9 (PTAB Mar. 13, 2013) ("processor
adapted to").
66Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2002); SciMed
Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
67 Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1328; SciMed Life Sys., 242 F.3d at 1340-41.
68 Kappos and Davis, Functional Claiming and the Patent Balance, 18 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 365, 371-72 (2015) (explaining that the Williamson court deemphasized the reliance on
nonce words to interpret a claim as means-plus-function in the absence of "means." Kappos
points out that dicta in Williamson suggests even naked nonce words may avoid § 112(f) if
the right definition can be found in a dictionary. Modified nonce words are nonce words with
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held in Apple that "even if a patentee elects to use a generic claim term, such as a
nonce word or a verbal construct, properly construing that term (in view of the
specification, prosecution history, etc.) may still provide sufficient structure such
that the presumption against means-plus-function claiming remains intact."69 Due
to the complexities of technology, Professor Chien warns that the "application of
[§ 112(f)] in every context may be over inclusive because the boundary between
functional and nonfunctional language is heavily dependent on the technology
involved." 70
The determination of whether a claim contains functional language is also
dependent on "whether a skilled artisan would conclude, after reading the
specification, that a claim limitation is "so devoid of structure" that the drafter
engaged in means-plus-function claiming."71 The Apple court determined that a
person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) working in the software arts would
understand that "processor" is a sufficiently definite structure comprising a
microprocessor with sufficient circuitry to perform the described functions, and
thus did not invoke § 112(f). 72 Structure, the court held, may also be provided by
"describing the claim limitation's operation such as its input, output or
preceding descriptors, such as "distributed learning control module," where "distributed
learning control" modify the nonce word "module")
69 Apple, 757 F.3d at 1299.
7o Colleen V Chien, Comment letter on PTO-P-2012-0052/Request for Comments and
Notice of Roundtable Events for Partnership for Enhancement of Quality of Software-Related
Patents, 78 Fed. Reg. 292, 11 (Jan. 3, 2013).
71 Mass. Inst. of Tech. & Elecs. for Imaging, Inc. v. Abacus Software, 462 F.3d 1344,
1355-56 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
72 Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1297-1300 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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connections." 7 3
In contrast, the Bosch court found that the claim terms "program recognition
device" and "program loading device" did not provide any structural guidance
because they merely identified functions to be performed by the device, and thus
triggered § 1 12(f).7 4 The subjectivity involved in determining when a claim term
provides sufficient structure makes it difficult to determine when a claim is a
means-plus-function claim. Thus, depending on claim construction, § 112(f) may
not be applicable if sufficient structure is found in otherwise what would appear
to be a functional claim.
ii. The Standard for Sufficient Disclosure of Structure is Ambiguous
Lemley's solution also does not take into consideration that the requirement
for structure is not well defined. Lemley uses the Federal Circuit's current
approach of requiring disclosure of an algorithm for § 112(f) claims as his
strategy to limit the breadth of software claims; however, the algorithm
requirement is unlikely to have any real limiting effect without guidelines for
what needs to be disclosed. 75 Disclosure of algorithm in prose or high-level flow
charts that only describe a "high level process flow" may not disclose structure to
the degree of specificity required to define the boundaries of the software
73 Id. at 1299.
74 Robert Bosch, LLC v. Snap-On Inc., 769 F.3d 1094, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
7s Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int' Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1333, 1338 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (holding that when a claimed function is performed by software, an algorithm is a
critical component of the relevant structure and recitation of a general purpose computer or
software alone is insufficient).
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invention.76 For an algorithm to provide sufficient boundaries, the disclosed
algorithm must explain how to implement the recited function in enough detail to
allow a POSITA to take the actions necessary to implement the solution. 77 An
algorithm that fails to satisfy this requirement does little more than restate general
functionality.7 8
(a) Determining Layers of Abstraction
Because of the many layers of software abstraction, boundaries for describing
an algorithm are difficult to define. 79 In her study of functional patents, Chien
utilized the programming paradigm of five levels of software abstraction to
determine whether support for functional claims was sufficiently provided.so She
concluded that while § 112(f) is helpful for weeding out unsupported functional
claims, "greater clarity through court decisions would be needed to determine the
scope of "supported" functional claims." 8 1
The five levels of software abstraction include: functional abstraction, abstract
data types, pseudo code, data structures, and source code. 82 At the highest level,
76 See id. at 1334 (holding that a disclosure that simply describes a function to be
performed or an outcome lacks the necessary structure).
" AllVoice Computing PLC v. Nuance Commc'ns, Inc., 504 F.3d 1236, 1245 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
78 Id. at 1245-46
79 Chien, supra note 70, at 41.
80 Id. at 6.
81 Id. at 13.
82 Id. at 6.
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functional abstraction defines only the end goal to be achieved without the how. 83
For example, a functional abstraction for providing directions would be "getting
from point A to point B." This functional level of abstraction, Lemley notes, is the
most troubling for software patents. 84 Disclosure at the functional abstraction
level is insufficient because it merely describes the goal without explaining how.
This is typically the problematic type of structure disclosed by functional software
patents. 85
The next two layers, abstract data types and pseudo code levels of abstraction,
describe software independently of any computing infrastructure. 86 Abstract data
types describe software in various building blocks that are needed to carry out a
particular function. Abstract data types for the example above may include
"walking," "driving," and "metro," where different directions for each mode of
transportation may be computed. Pseudo code incorporates a general approach to
how to implement the function using words to describe a collection of operations
to be implemented in source code.
An example of pseudo code may include: (1) determine final destination, (2)
determine starting point, (3) determine mode of transportation, and (4) generate
directions based on steps 1-3. Disclosure at the pseudo code level using abstract
data types is the most helpful because steps for how to perform a function are
disclosed at a high enough level for a POSITA to understand. Because it is a
narrative, no special knowledge is required as the description is not tied to any
83 Id.
84 Chien, supra note 70, at 7.
85 Id.
86 Id.
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specific computing platform. This level of abstraction should be the minimum
level of abstraction used for software disclosure. Unfortunately, it is just as
difficult to define a standard for the amount of detail pseudo code and abstract
data types should provide. In the directions pseudo code example discussed
above, the four steps do not provide enough information about how exactly
directions are computed. A patentee trying to evade disclosure may point to flow
charts that suffer from the same deficiency. Hence, pseudo code that is too
ambiguous does not provide sufficient disclosure.
The last two levels of software abstraction are data structures and source code,
which are used to implement the function for a specific computing
infrastructure. 87 Data structures are programming constructs used to implement
abstract data types and functions, such as linked lists, binary trees, and arrays.
Source code entails the specific computer code written to implement the function,
which is typically written in a computer language such as C++, or Java. While
these levels of detail are typically too detailed and require a particular level of
expertise to understand, this level of abstraction has been recommended as the
only sufficient level of abstraction where a patentee cannot evade implementation
details.
Because source code provides the actual step-by-step instructions to
implement a function, it will necessarily provide implementation details. While,
source code seems to be an appropriate level of abstraction, it may be too
overbearing to provide any useful information. It seems the best level of
abstraction would be an adequate level of higher level pseudo code disclosure
87 Id. at 8.
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with supplemental source code snippets to provide implementation details to
explain the inventive contribution.
U.S. Patent No. 5,930,474 is an example of disclosure provided at every level
of abstraction.8 8 The claim is directed to organizing and delivering information
such as business services, entertainment, news, and consumer goods to a user
based on a specified location. 89 In this example, disclosure at the lowest level of
abstraction, source code, does not provide any helpful insight into the
implementation. The specification describes the technology at a functional
abstract level, describing the goal of providing results relevant to a user based on
location. 90 It also provides abstract data types as databases organizing information
and pseudo code for search subroutines in narrative form.9 1 Additionally, data
structures with HTML source code are disclosed.92 As shown in Appendix I, the
narrative pseudo code provides the most helpful layer of abstraction in describing
how the function was implemented at a high level in text.
In contrast, the data structures and html source code are unhelpful as the code
is not only too specific and unreadable as a block of code, but also does not
provide meaningful clues to the overall implementation. The appropriate level of
abstraction must be one where a POSITA can understand the implementation
without exerting excessive effort. Source code may be too low level to be
8 Id. at 11 (Chien uses this patent as the ideal example of proper disclosure at every level
of software abstraction).
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practical.
(b) The Problem with Source Code
The struggle to provide guidelines for an appropriate level of disclosure
remains unresolved. Advocates of Lemley's solution support the adoption of
source code as the preferred form of structure for disclosing an algorithm. 93 In
contrast, technology companies in the software industry have pushed back against
this requirement, recognizing that this level of detail is unnecessary and requires a
certain level of expertise to understand the programming language, paradigms,
and complexities of the code. 94
Because source code is considered to be the blueprints of software, it is
understandable that one who is not a POSITA would assume that a line-by-line
inspection of the instructions would reveal the algorithm used to implement the
93 See Chien, supra note 70, at 13; Holly K. Victorson, Structure From Nothing and
Claims For Free: Using a Whole-System View of the Patent System to Improve Notice and
Predictability For Software Patents, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 497, 518 (2014)
(claiming that the source code should be required to help examiners compare equivalents and
resolve ambiguities in the algorithm); Robert E. Thomas, Debugging Software Patents:
Increasing Innovation and Reducing Uncertainty in the Judicial Reform of Software Patent
Law, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 191, 235 (2008) (stating that source
code appears to be "the quintessential way of meeting the patentability test" for software
claims).
94 Comments of Microsoft Corp. and Adobe Sys. Inc., In re Request for Comments and
Notice of Roundtable Events for Partnership for Enhancement of Quality of Software-Related
Patents, 78 Fed. Reg. 292, 294 (Jan. 3, 2013); Comments of Google Inc., In re Request for
Comments and Notice of Roundtable Events for Partnership for Enhancement of Quality of
Software-Related Patents, 78 Fed. Reg. 292 (Apr. 15, 2013),
http://www.us pto. ov/patents/law/comments/sw-e google 20130415.pdf; See also Request
for Comments and Notice of Roundtable Events for Partnership for Enhancement of Quality
of Software-Related Patents, 78 Fed. Reg. 292-93 (Jan. 3, 2013).
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software. 95 However, as seen in the example above, source code may in actuality
be less helpful than pseudo code. 96 Chien confirmed in her study that detailed
source code over high-level disclosure of code elements do not necessarily
promote technical progress. 97
From a prosecution perspective, given the limited time an examiner has to
review a patent application, it is unreasonable to expect an examiner to dig
through code to determine whether disclosure of the algorithm is sufficient. 9 8 To
further complicate things, an algorithm may be implemented through a series of
functions that call many other layers of functions. 99 Source code may also be
optimized and may incorporate prior art technologies.1 00 Because of all these
factors, source code is often difficult to understand and interpret without
specialized expertise and guidance from an inventor. 10 1
As an example, code that implements encryption algorithms or codecs for
encoding audio and video may involve complex mathematical equations that
integrate algorithms in the prior art. Separating the inventor's contribution from
95 Id.
96 Fonar Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 1543, 1548-49 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting an
expert witness testifying that source code would not be helpful because it is too machine
specific)("What's much more important is to have a description of what the software has to
do.").
97 Chien, supra note 70, at 12.
98 Comments of Microsoft Corp. and Adobe Sys. Inc., In re Request for Comments and
Notice of Roundtable Events for Partnership for Enhancement of Quality of Software-Related
Patents, 78 Fed. Reg. 292, 294 (Jan. 3, 2013); Thomas, supra note 93, at 236-237.
99 Collins, supra note 62, at 1405-06.
100 Thomas, supra note 93, at 235.
101 Id.
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prior art may also be a difficult and tedious task, as standard libraries are often
used. Requiring source code examination may create excessive overhead and
cause additional delay to the already slow patent examination process.
Construing equivalent software functions is another area that is especially
tricky. It is difficult to determine equivalents of source code because not all code
is created equal. Two pieces of code that implement the same function may look
completely different, whereas code that looks similar may perform completely
different functions. 102 Additionally, equivalent code may be written in different
languages, use different programming paradigms and constructs to implement a
particular function. 103 Limiting functional claims to the four corners of source
code may not solve the problem. The lack of an established metric for comparing
algorithms requires examiners and judges to make difficult discretionary
judgments. 104
In light of these issues, perhaps the emphasis should not be on requiring
disclosure at a particular level of abstraction. Instead, the focus should be
disclosure at whatever level of abstraction that is necessary to enable a POSITA
to implement the solution. If the POSITA understands how to implement each
functional element from the disclosure, then the disclosure for that component is
sufficient. It may also be easier to determine equivalents based on the similarity of
the pseudo code steps used to implement the function rather than comparing the
equivalence of two pieces of code.
102 Id. at 234-236; Ben Klemens, Math You Can't Use: Patents, Copyright and Software
43 (2006).
103 Thomas, supra note 93, at 236.
10 Id.
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iii. §1 12(f) Over Restricts Claims
Another problem with the automatic application of § 112(f) is that it may
unnecessarily narrow claims. The Federal Circuit has generally not applied §
112(f) when a claim limitation contains a term that is "used in common parlance
or by persons of skill in the pertinent art to designate structure."10 5 Thus, under
the fundamental patent canon of interpretation, a claimed invention should not be
limited by preferred embodiments or specific examples in the specification when
the claim is not a means-plus-function claim. 106 By automatically applying §
112(f) to all functional software claims, Lemley violates the canon by imposing
an over restrictive standard that bars an inventor from claiming his full invention.
Lemley's solution punishes all functional software claims equally by
restricting the claim to the structures disclosed by the specification without first
evaluating the significance of the invention. 107 This is in conflict with the
Supreme Court's doctrine that it is a "cardinal sin" of patent law to read the
limitations of the specification into the claim by construing claim elements
outside of the concept of the inventive contribution.1 0 8 In claim construction, a
court should first determine what the real merit of the alleged discovery or
invention is and whether it has advanced the art substantially. 109 In light of the
inventive contribution, the court should be liberal in its construction of the patent
to give the inventor the reward he deserves if the patent provides a substantial
105 Flo Healthcare Sols., LLC v. Kappos, 697 F.3d at 1374.
106 Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d at 1328.
107 Lemley, supra note 2, at 957.
108 SciMed Life Sys., 242 F.3d at 1340.
109 Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. at 63.
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contribution, but a narrower scope if the contribution is only a small step. 110
Lemley, however, would rather over restricting the rare pioneering patent than
risk harming society by allowing a patent that's too broad."' Lemley's approach
treats all software inventions as incremental contributions. 112 He argues that
inventors should be "forbidden from substituting broad functional language for an
actual implementation of the invention," and that "distinguishing between
programs that perform the same function in a different way is precisely what
patent law is supposed to do." 113 Even if the inventive contribution is the
discovery of a new function itself, Lemley insists that software patents should still
be limited to the implementation the patentee developed. 114 Although Lemley
recognizes that software inventors could still claim a genus if the claims are
limited to the actual technology developed and defined at the appropriate level of
abstraction, his failure to provide a standard to define an appropriate level of
abstraction makes this possibility a rare exception. 115
110 Wright Co. v. Herring-Curtiss Co., 211 F. 654, 655 (2d Cir. 1914) (awarding broader
claim scope for wing warping because of the pioneering nature of the invention).
III Lemley, supra note 2, at 952.
112 Id. at 960. Incremental contributions are contributions that add only small
improvements to existing inventions, compared to pioneering contributions, which are
revolutionary in changing technology. For example, Wright's flying machine is a pioneering
contribution that received broad scope because of the advancement the contribution provided
in flying. In contrast, an incremental contribution could be a particular wing design to make
the plane more aerodynamic.
113 Id. at 958-60.
114 Id. at 961.
Is Id. at 956. See also Chien, supra note 70, at 5 (analyzing various levels of abstraction
in which to break down software in order to determine what structure would be sufficient to
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From the inventor's perspective forcing all software functional patents to be
subject to the requirements of § 112(f) may end up disincentivizing inventors
from seeking patent protection. Instead, inventors may choose to keep their
inventions private as trade secrets. Because means-plus-function claiming
significantly narrows claims, it also has the disadvantage of being easy to work
around, through step rearrangement or de minimis changes. 116 For these reasons,
patentees generally avoid means-plus-function claiming. 117 Invoking means-plus-
function claiming may not only thwart the patentee from getting the full
protection the invention deserves, but also may harm society as trade secrets
prevent the disclosure of information to the public.
III. ADDRESSING OVERBROAD FUNCTIONAL CLAIMS PRE-ISSUANCE
THROUGH PROSECUTION
Overbroad functional patents that are sifted out from the beginning will not be
able to cause further harm down the road. Thus, if we want to prevent the growth
of future problematic patents, we should preemptively invalidate them during
prosecution. Addressing broad claims pre-issuance through prosecution offers two
benefits. First, because granted patents are presumed to be valid, addressing the
problem early on will be less expensive and less difficult to overcome than if such
patents were addressed post grant.118 Additionally, problematic claims that are
describe the functionality of the software in specific detail without limiting a solution to a
particular computing infrastructure).
116 Lemley, supra note 2, at 918.
117 Id.
118 Microsoft Corp. v. i4i LP, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011) (establishing that issued patents
have a strong presumption of validity).
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detected pre-issuance may be corrected by giving the patentee a chance to amend
such claims to its proper scope. 119 Second, addressing broad claims during
prosecution gives the patentee the chance to clarify the meaning of ambiguous
claim elements and required structures, instead of the court doing so retroactively.
The prosecution history not only clarifies the significance and scope of the
invention as well as ambiguous claim terms but also provides the groundwork for
future claim construction and the determination of equivalents. 120
A. Addressing Functional Claims Through the Nonobviousness Doctrine
During prosecution, functional claims that are overbroad will be invalidated
for being obvious. 12 1 This aligns with Lemley's goal to prevent the patentee from
"substituting broad functional language for an actual implementation of the
invention" at the point of novelty without introducing claim construction
complexities associated with invoking § 112(f). 122  Accordingly, the
nonobviousness doctrine is a better approach as it focuses the analysis to the
scope of the invention.
119 Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(holding that "the patent drafter is in the best position to resolve the ambiguity in the patent
claims, and it is highly desirable that patent examiners demand that applicants do so in
appropriate circumstances so that the patent can be amended during prosecution rather than
attempting to resolve the ambiguity in litigation).
120 See Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (explaining that "prosecution history estoppel precludes a patentee from obtaining
under the doctrine of equivalents coverage of subject matter that has been relinquished during
the prosecution of its patent application").
121 35 U.S.C § 103 (2011).
122 Lemley, supra note 2, at 959.
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Under the nonobviousness doctrine, an invention is obvious when the
differences between the invention and the prior art are "such that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to
a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains." 123
The nonobviousness doctrine was established to allow patents only for "those
inventions which would not be disclosed or devised but for the inducement of a
patent."124 This inducement standard not only helps to "promote the progress of
the sciences and useful arts," but also prevents the proliferation of economically
insignificant patents that not only contribute to the patent thicket, but also are
expensive to license. 125 Because the nonobviousness doctrine weeds out trivial
improvements from the prior art, nonobvious inventions are the actual inventive
contributions that warrant patent protection. 126 The nonobviousness doctrine
effectively serves as a gatekeeper, filtering out broad claims without creating
special rules for the category of software patents.
i. The Standard for Determining Nonobviousness
In order to determine nonobviousness, the scope and content of the prior art,
the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art, the level of
ordinary skill in the art, and secondary considerations are considered from the
perspective of the POSITA for being obvious. 127 Secondary considerations such
123 35 U.S.C § 103 (2011).
124 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 11 (1996). See also Michael Abramowicz &
John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590 (2011).
125 Lemley, supra note 2, at 920-928.
126 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
127 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. at 406-07 (citing Graham v. John Deere Co.,
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as commercial success, long-felt needs for the invention, the failure of others to
create the invention, unexpected results, efforts by others to copy the invention,
and licensing the invention, are additional considerations that weight towards the
invention being nonobvious. 128 On the other hand, simultaneous invention also
points towards the invention being obvious. 129 Today emphasis is placed on
secondary considerations to determine obviousness. 130
Historically, the nonobviousness doctrine was a difficult doctrine to apply
prior to KSR because a finding of obviousness depended on a teaching,
suggestion or motivation (the TSM test) to combine prior art. 131 Since a teaching,
suggestion or motivation was rarely explicitly disclosed in the prior art itself, the
nature of the problem, or the knowledge of a POSITA, obviousness was seldom
used to invalidate claims. 132 However, post KSR, the TSM test is no longer a
required to invoke the obviousness doctrine. 133 Other factors such as a particular
combination being "obvious to try" or the creative steps and assumptions that a
POSITA would consider are now sufficient for a finding of obviousness. 134 As a
result, nonobviousness has become more applicable and should be used more
383 U.S. 1, 17-18) (1966)).
128 Id. See also Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 229 F.3d 1120,
1129 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (listing secondary factors for determining nonobviousness).
129 Id.
130 Brenda M. Simon, The Implications of Technological Advancement for Obviousness,
19 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REv. 331, 371-72, (2013).
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rigorously to weed out functional claims that are so broad that they become
obvious.
ii. The Importance of the Inventive Contribution for Determining Claim Scope
The nonobviousness doctrine ensures that even if an invention meets the
novelty and utility requirements, it may not be deserving of a patent if it is merely
a trivial improvement to the prior art.135 The nonobviousness doctrine measures
the "technical accomplishment" of the inventor's contribution to determine
whether the development is significant enough over the prior art to deserve
patentability. 136 If the inventive contribution is found to be nontrivial, the scope
given to a claim should be proportionate with the magnitude of the contribution.
A claim should receive broad scope if the inventive contribution is pioneering and
narrow scope if the inventive contribution is merely an improvement. 137 The
determination of the inventor's contribution not only helps to restrict the scope of
the claims, but also defines the boundaries of what the inventor recognized as his
actual invention at the time of filing. 138
For example, a claim that covers unlocking a device using any gesture (e.g., a
swipe) would be obvious without further limitations. However, if the inventive
contribution was a particular type of gesture such as a "force press," where the
135 Id.
136 Id.; see also 35 U.S.C § 102 (2011); 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
137 Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537 (1898); Wright Co. v.
Herring-Curtiss Co., 211 F. 654, 655 (2d Cir. 1914).
138 Robert P. Merges and John F. Duffy, Patent Law and Policy: Cases and Materials
784, n.4 (6th ed. 2013) (explaining Judge Hand's approach to claim interpretation by first
seeking an "intelligent understanding of the invention" as a prerequisite).
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device is able to determine different pressures of pressing, then the claim may
only pass nonobviousness if it is limited to that restriction. Under the nonobvious
doctrine, the claim for any type of gesture used as a password would be found
obvious and hence invalid. Understanding the contribution of the invention
upfront during prosecution will provide a roadmap for determining claim
construction in future litigation and prevent patentees from stretching their claims
to cover equivalents that are outside the scope of their inventions.
iii. Criticisms of the Nonobviousness Doctrine
(a) Using Experts to Facilitate the Discovery of Prior Art
One of the criticisms of the nonobviousness doctrine is the difficulty in
finding relevant prior art references to render an invention obvious. 139 One option
for mitigating this is to develop a forum of experts for various subject matters
whom examiners may then consult to find relevant prior art. Crowdsourcing has
also been used to bring together diverse groups to broaden the consideration of
prior art. 14 0 Several such solutions exist today to help supplement prior art
searching. Web-based organizations such as Software Patent Institute have
aggregated prior art for certain fields of software that were not available
electronically. 14 1 Additionally, Article One Partners, provides a prior art search
service through its online community. 14 2 The USPTO has provided a fast track
139 Simon, supra note 130 at 373.
140 Id.
141 SOFTWARE PATENT INSTITUTE, http://spi.org (last visited Nov. 23, 2015).
142 About Article One Partners, Article One, http://www.articleonepartnerscom/compaii
(last visited Nov. 23, 2015).
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examination that utilizes an open review process where prior art received from an
online public community is used to assess patent applications. 143 Thus, better
prior art searching should help examiners utilize nonobviousness to reduce the
number of functional patents that are ultimately granted.
(b) Overcoming the Subjectivity of Nonobviousness
Like § 112, the nonobviousness doctrine is a standard that critics have held is
dependent on subjective interpretation. 144 However, such subjectivity is also
problematic in other doctrines for determining patentability, such as enablement,
utility, patentable subject matter, and means-plus-function claiming. 145 It is
important to focus, instead, on establishing guidelines to help standardize the
application of doctrines with subjectivity concerns in order to provide
consistency. While recent case law has offered some guidance for determining
level of skill of a POSITA, there may be some subjectivity in determining the
level of skill of a POSITA. 14 6
143 PEER TO PATENT, http://www.1eertopatent.org (last visited Nov. 23, 2015).
1" Simon, supra note 130, 354-55; Abbott Labs v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1352
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that a finding of obviousness is highly dependent on context
"including the characteristics of the science of technology, its state of advance, the nature of
the known choices, the specificity or generality of the prior art, and the predictability of
results in the area of interest").
145 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
146 Simon, supra note 130, at 338-341 (discussing the level of skill of a POSITA for
nonobviousness purposes); Joseph P. Meara, Just Who Is the Person Having Ordinary Skill in
the Art? Patent Law's Mysterious Personage, 77 WASH. L. REV. 267, 267 (2002) (comparing
the POSITA to "a reasonable person of tort law"); Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A
Realistic Approach to the Obviousness of Inventions, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 989, 991-92
(2008) ("Obviousness should be reconceived as a truly realistic inquiry, one that focuses on
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During prosecution, however, this is less of a problem as the patentee is a
practitioner in the field and may confirm what a POSITA would know. Patent
examiners may further consult experts to determine whether a POSITA would
find an invention obvious. 147 The examiner is also expected to have a certain level
of knowledge and expertise in the particular technological area of a given
invention in order to assess whether two inventions are similar. 148 This base level
knowledge that both the examiner and patentee must possess provides a safeguard
against frivolous findings of obviousness.
Lastly, the patentee's ability to rebut the examiner's finding of obviousness
during prosecution provides a safeguard for unreasonable subjective
interpretation. 149 Patentees may rebut § 103 obviousness rejections by showing
the examiner why the invention would not have been obvious in light of the prior
art references. 15 0 Appeals through the Patent Trial and Appeals Board provide
what the POSITA and the marketplace actually know and believe, not what they might
believe in a hypothetical, counterfactual world."). See also In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017,
1020 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (presuming a POSITA be working in the shop and having knowledge
of all the prior art references hanging on the walls around him); In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350,
1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (indicating that a POSITA is expected to have knowledge of even
hidden or difficult to locate prior art); KSR Int'1 Co., 550 U.S. at 413 (considering the creative
steps and assumptions a POSITA in the field would apply).
147 Simon, supra note 130, at 315.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 346-51.
1so Unigene Labs., Inc. v. Apotex Labs., Inc., 655 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(stating that a formulation is "not obvious if a person of ordinary skill would not select and
combine the prior art references to reach the claimed composition or formulation"), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1755 (2012).
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additional safeguards for overturning wrongful findings of obviousness. 151
B. Revisiting § 112(f) In Prosecution
In prosecution, § 112(f) is not an effective narrowing mechanism. The
inventor may avoid the restrictions of § 112(f) by simply changing the wording of
the claim to avoid triggering § 112(f). 152 By adding sufficient structure to the
claim or avoiding the use of functional language, a patentee may amend his
claims to simply fall outside of the statute. 153 The patentee may alternatively
cancel the claim completely, thus avoiding the issue altogether. Because the claim
has not issued yet, the examiner and patentee have more flexibility to negotiate
the claims of the inventive contribution and to determine the appropriate scope for
the invention. 154
§ 112(f) may be helpful to supplement nonobviousness in cases where a broad
claim would otherwise be invalidated for being obvious. Under those
circumstances, invoking § 112(f) may save the claim, albeit only under a very
narrow interpretation. 155 For example, in Amazon's one-click checkout claim, a
broad claim claiming the one-click checkout functionality from a shopping
1I Jason Rantanen, The Federal Circuit's New Obviousness Jurisprudence: An Empirical
Study, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 709, 733 (2013) (indicating that appeals arising from the PTO
are reviewed by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board).
152 LightingWorld, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d at 1359.
153 Claims that are not functional or provide structure are not means-plus-function claims.
154 Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 514 F.3d at 1255 (indicating that during prosecution
the examiner and patentee may negotiate on the claim language and scope of the claim).
155 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012). By reading in the specification, a functional claim that
would otherwise have been found obvious may instead be deemed valid if it is narrowed to a
specific implementation.
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website would not pass the nonobviousness requirement. 156 However, under §
112(f), the one-click technology may be valid, but restricted to only shopping
websites that store user credentials in the form of cookies once the user has
logged into the website.
However, this limited use of § 112(f) seems unrealistic in the context of
prosecution because the patentee still holds the power to amend the claims. 157
Because the patentee knows his invention the best, it is in the patentee's best
interest to amend the claim under his terms, rather than having the examiner read
the specification into the claim. In practice, because it is easy to avoid infringing
means-plus-function claims due to its narrow scope, patentees will opt to amend
the claim instead of settling for a means-plus-function claim. 158 It is also more
efficient for the examiner to reject the claim for obviousness than to go through
the mental gymnastics to find a reason to apply § 112(f) and further analysis to
find a restrictive, narrow reading. §112(f) may not be needed at all, if not
sparingly used to allow the occasional, intentionally, narrow claim during
prosecution.
IV. ADDRESSING OVERBROAD FUNCTIONAL CLAIMS POST-ISSUANCE
THROUGH MARKMAN HEARINGS
While it is better to prevent overbroad functional claims from getting issued in
the first place, courts have a second opportunity to tackle overbroad software
claims post grant when they resurface in litigation. More recently, the PTO's post
15' U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (filed Sept. 12, 1997).
17 Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 514 F.3d at 1255
158 Id.
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grant proceedings and inter partes review have become a popular mechanism for
third parties to invalidate issued patents in parallel with litigation, but that
discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. The paper instead will focus on how
courts may better address validity through Markman hearings to reduce litigation.
The goal post-issuance is to figure out what exactly is the invention, so that
courts can retroactively narrow down the scope of the overbroad claim or
invalidate the claim if it is obvious. Typically, in patent litigation, courts utilize
Markman hearings prior to trial to determine the meaning of disputed claim
elements as a matter of law. 15 9 Narrowing claims and evaluating the validity of
claims earlier in the proceeding reduces expensive litigation costs and saves
courts from wasting time hearing cases involving invalid patents.
Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit has limited the ability of courts to
invalidate bad patent claims during claim construction by divorcing claim
interpretation from claim validity issues such as nonobviousness. 160 Instead, the
Federal Circuit conducts claim construction without consideration of the
inventor's actual inventive contribution to avoid addressing validity. 161 Although
the Federal Circuit adopted this approach to simplify litigation proceedings, the
end result is more costly as judges are more likely to improperly construe claims
or determine claim scope without knowledge of the inventor's inventive
contribution to the art.162 Thus, although the Federal Circuit will need to revise its
159 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
160 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F. 3d at 1313; United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. at 49
(1966); Merges and Duffy, supra note 138, at 769, n.2.
161 Phillips, 415 F. 3d at 1313.
162 Id.
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approach to claim interpretation in order for courts to consider questions of
validity, such as nonobviousness during a Markman hearing, enabling courts to
address validity pretrial is well worth the effort.
Even applying Lemley's solution during Markman hearings will require the
Federal Circuit to consider questions of validity. The Federal Circuit throws a
wrinkle into Lemley's solution as a result of its disparate interpretation of the
§ 112(f) statute. 163 Lemley's approach requires that courts to first determine the
alleged inventive contribution in order to restrict the entire claim to the scope
presented by the specification. 164 However, the Federal Circuit does not consider
the merits of the overall inventive contribution in its interpretation of § 112(f) at
all. 16 5 As a result, the use of § 112(f) may not provide the narrowing power
Lemley intended it to wield. Additionally, the rebuttable presumption against §
112(f) adds a second layer of claim interpretation, which may further increase
litigation. Despite these drawbacks, Lemley's solution may still help to reduce
broad functional claims if the Federal Circuit reforms its interpretation of § 112(f)
to include the overall inventive contribution.
A. Reforming Markman Hearings to Include Nonobviousness Determinations
i. Federal Circuit Divorces Claim Validity from Claim Construction
Given the importance of the inventive contribution and the Supreme Court's
doctrine that courts should construe patents by "first look[ing] into the art to find
what the real merit of the alleged discovery or invention is and whether it has
163 Id.
164 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012).
161 See infra Part IV.B.
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advanced the art substantially," it is important understand why historically the
Federal Circuit chose to divorce claim validity from claim construction. 166
One reason the Federal Circuit opted to keep claim interpretation and patent
validity issues separate is because it wanted to avoid "mongrel issues," which
include mixed questions of law and fact. 167 Claim construction is a question of
law, while issues pertaining to validity involve underlying questions of fact. The
Federal Circuit opted to remove questions of fact in order to simplify claim
interpretation and to avoid dependencies on jury findings. As a result, questions
involving validity, such as obviousness and inventive contribution are not
considered during claim construction. 168
This approach is consistent with the Federal Circuit's reluctance to narrow
construction to save claim validity. 169 Under this canon of construction, if two
interpretations are both plausible, the narrower interpretation that preserves the
validity of the patent should be selected. 170 However, in its efforts to avoid
addressing validity, the Federal Circuit only applies this rule as a last resort if a
claim is still ambiguous after all other tools of claim construction have been
166 Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. at 63; See also Merges
and Duffy, supra note 138, at 769, n.2.
167 Id.
168 Although nonobviousness, itself, is a legal question, because it involves underlying
questions of fact, it is not considered by the Federal Circuit during claim construction. KSR
Int'1 Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. at 413-15 (indicating that nonobviousness is a legal
question).
169 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d at 1327 (holding that the Federal Circuit has "not
endorsed a regime in which validity analysis is a regular component of claim construction").
170 Merges and Duffy, supra note 138, at 772, n.1.
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exhausted. 17 1 As a result, this approach has led to costly litigation when
ambiguous claim elements are left unrestricted. 172
The Federal Circuit has also established a de novo standard of review for
reviewing district court claim interpretations, although this standard of review has
become quite controversial for "mongrel issues." 173 Despite this, the Federal
Circuit has extended this standard of review for reviewing the PTO's claim
interpretations, although prior Federal Circuit cases and the Supreme Court have
suggested giving the PTO deference. 174 Because of the controversy over the
standard of review, the Federal Circuit may have intentionally kept validity
separate from claim construction in order to preserve its power to determine claim
construction without having to defer to district court findings of fact.175
171 MBO Labs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 474 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
172 Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 385 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004), 481 F.3d 1371
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (requiring two Federal Circuit appeals to resolve as a result of the Federal
Circuit, initially refusing to restrict the ambiguous claim element to preserve validity and then
later invalidating the claim).
173 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (indicating that the
Federal Circuit has adopted a de novo standard of review for claim construction); United
States v. Selioutsky, 409 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 2005) (indicating that the standard of review
for mixed questions of law and fact are either de novo or clearly erroneous depending on the
question being predominantly legal or factual).
174 Merges and Duffy, supra note 138, at 805, n.5 (The Supreme Court has held that "an
administrative agency is typically entitled to more deference than a district court on factual
findings because an agency is thought to have more expertise in its field of regulation.").
17' Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 U.S. 831, 832 (2015) (holding that the
Federal Circuit should give deference to district courts for subsidiary findings of fact
pertaining when extrinsic evidence is used).
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ii. The Significance of the "Inventive Contribution"
Removing validity from claim construction has led the Federal Circuit to
approach claim interpretation without consideration of the inventor's inventive
contribution at all, despite the Supreme Court doctrine that "claims are to be
construed in the light of the specifications and both are to be read with a view to
ascertaining the invention." 176 This is problematic because judges are unable to
understand the merits of the inventive contribution and to determine what scope
an invention deserves.
Two problems arise when courts proceed to interpret claims without
consideration of the patentee's inventive contribution. First, courts cannot
determine if the patent should not have been granted in the first place because the
invention was obvious. Because issued patents are presumed to be valid, courts
cannot invalidate claims if it cannot show why a claim lacks a nonobvious
contribution. 177 Second, courts cannot differentiate between "pioneering patents"
and those that are "improvement patents" and thus, cannot accurately determine
when to award broader scope and when to restrict scope. 178 Pioneering inventions
have traditionally been awarded broader scope because the invention contributes a
function "of such novelty and importance as to mark a distinct step in the progress
176 Merges and Duffy, supra note 138, at 769; United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 49
(1966).
177 Microsoft Corp. v. i4i LP., 131 S. Ct. 2238 (establishing that issued patents have a
strong presumption of validity).
178 Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. at 537 (holding that "to what
liberality of construction these claims are entitled depends, to a certain extent, upon the
character of the invention and whether it is what is termed, in ordinary parlance, a
"pioneer.").
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of the art, as distinguished from a mere improvement or perfection of what had
gone before." 179 However, if courts cannot discern the type of invention, then
courts may unfairly narrow the claims of pioneering inventions deserving of
broad scope. Furthermore, it is difficult for courts to determine the scope of
equivalents if it is unaware of the significance of the invention.1 8 0 By leaving such
determinations to a jury to decide, courts lose the opportunity to equip judges,
who are typically more knowledgeable than jurors in the software arts, to
proactively invalidate patents early on in the proceedings.
iii. Introducing the Nonobviousness Doctrine in Markman Hearings
In order to reform Markman hearings so that issues of fact may be considered,
the Federal Circuit should consider adopting the holdings of Teva, which suggests
that judges may make subsidiary fact-findings ancillary to its task of determining
legal questions in pretrial hearings.18 1 While the Federal Circuit has interpreted
Teva narrowly, the Federal Circuit should extend the holdings of Teva to allow
courts to rule on legal questions relating to validity issues, such as obviousness,
during pretrial hearings. Since courts are ruling on legal questions based on their
own subsidiary fact findings, it no longer makes sense to separate questions of
179 See id.
1I See infra Part IV.B.3.b.
181 Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 U.S. at 832 (indicating that in some
cases, the district court may make subsidiary findings of fact to determine the meaning of
particular claim terms). See also Robert P. Merges and John F. Duffy, Patent Law and Policy:
Cases and Materials 2015 Update 62, n.3 (Supp. 2015) (suggesting that pretrial hearings
determining legal issues based on their own subsidiary fact findings can be applied for patent
validity issues such as obviousness).
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law from questions of fact. 182 Since claim construction issues are closely tied to
issues of validity, allowing courts to consider validity enables courts to
preemptively weed out overbroad patents during pretrial hearings. As an
additional benefit, judges are also made aware of the inventive contribution by
investigating underlying facts, which will allow them to more accurately construe
claim elements.
One criticism of using nonobviousness and claim interpretation to tackle
overbroad claims is that both nonobviousness and claim interpretation involve
elements of subjectivity. 183 Historically courts have struggled with claim
interpretation in patent cases because the determination of inventive boundaries
requires subjective interpretation. 184 The complexity of the technology and the
lack of a common standard for drafting software claims have led courts to apply
divergent standards when interpreting software claims. 18 5 However, since claim
interpretation is a necessary part of patent litigation, minimizing the amount of
subjectivity involved in claim construction prior to trial instead of during trial
may still beneficially reduce future litigation.
Nonobviousness also suffers from being a standard based on a hypothetical
POSITA. 186 The POSITA lies at the heart of the obviousness determination as the
scope and content of the prior art, along with differences between the patentee's
182 Merges and Duffy, supra note 181, at 62, n.3.
183 Simon, supra note 130, at 347.
184 Id.
18 Chien, supra note 22, at 9.
186 See supra Part III.A.4.
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invention and the prior art are to be considered from the POSITA's perspective. 187
Courts will need to determine the level of skill and creativity of the POSITA.18 8 If
the standard for POSITA is set too low, then even an insignificant invention will
be deemed patentable, whereas if the standard is set too high, then defining a
POSITA as an expert will make eligible inventions unpatentable. 189 Courts may
consult expert witnesses to determine the appropriate level of skill in the art.190
B. Revisiting § 112(f) to Weed Out Overbroad Patents Post-issuance
i. Incorporating the Inventive Contribution into the § 112(f) Analysis
The Federal Circuit's extension of Teva to allow courts to make decisions
based on the court's subsidiary fact finding will allow courts to consider the
inventive contribution during claim construction. 19 1 Even if nonobviousness is not
considered during claim construction, the inventive contribution is critical for the
proper application of § 112(f).192 If § 112(f) is to have an impact in weeding out
187 Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1688-89 (2003).
188 See Simon, supra note 130, at 347. See also Zachary H. Valentine, Comment, A
Novel, Nonobvious Approach to Curb Abusive Patent Litigants, 21 ROGER WLLIAMS U. L.
REV. 118, 156-58 (2016) (explaining how courts examine nonobviousness by determining a
level of ordinary skill in a particular industry).
189 Id. See also Gregory Mandel, The Non-Obvious Problem: How the Indeterminate
Nonobviousness Standard Produces Excessive Patent Grants, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 57, 89
(2008).
190 Id.
191 Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831-32 (2015).
192 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that patent
specification is the most crucial element of an inventor's claim).
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patents post-issuance, the Federal Circuit will need to reform its interpretation of
§ 112(f) to incorporate the inventive contribution into its analysis. The courts
must first focus on determining the nonobvious contribution before turning to §
112(f) to restrict the functionality of the inventor's contribution.
ii. The Federal Circuit's Interpretation of § 112(f) is Inconsistent with the
Textual Meaning of the Statute
The statute § 112(f) states that "an element in a claim for a combination may
be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without
recital of structure . . . and such claim should be construed to cover the
corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and
equivalents thereof (emphasis added)." 193 Congress created the § 112(f) statute
intending for the entire claim to be limited to the structures disclosed in the
specification and its equivalents, not just the means-plus-function element. 194 The
Federal Circuit, however, adopts a different interpretation of § 112(f).1 95
Instead, the Federal Circuit interprets the statute to mean that each means-
plus-function element should be limited to the corresponding structures disclosed
in the specification and the equivalents thereof. 196 All other claim elements are to
be given full literal reach and are not limited by the embodiments and equivalents
specified in the specification. 197 This approach allows the Federal Circuit to
193 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012) (emphasis added).
194 Merges and Duffy, supra note 138, at 768, n.1.
195 Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1311.
196 Merges and Duffy, supra note 138, at 769 n.1.
197 Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313 (holding that the court should interpret the words of an
inventor's claim precisely in the same manner as someone else in the inventor's field of
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construe means-plus-function elements piecemeal without consideration of the
overarching inventive contribution as a matter of law. 198 The restrictions of §
112(f) are applied by simply matching a functional element with its corresponding
structure in the specification. 199 If no corresponding structure is found, the claim
fails the enablement requirement.200 The rest of the claim elements are given full
literal reach beyond the embodiments and equivalents specified in the
specification. 201
iii. Issues with the Federal Circuit's Interpretation of§ 112(f)
(a) Restricting Claim Elements Instead of the Overall Function Does Not End
Up Narrowing Claims
Under the Federal Circuit's approach, the overall invention may not be limited
to a particular implementation as intended by the invocation of § 112(f). 20 2
Because the Federal Circuit does not know what is the inventive contribution, it
cannot properly determine the appropriate scope to award the overall inventive
functionality. 203 Instead, it may end up restricting functional elements that are not
integral to the actual invention, while leaving the overall claim overbroad.




200 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012).
201 Merges and Duffy, supra note 138, at 768, n.1.
202 35 U.S.C § 112(a) (2012).
203 Merges and Duffy, supra note 138, at 768, n.1.
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restricting functional claim element "displaying a visual map of the classroom" to
certain devices for display, does not help when the actual invention is the overall
idea of providing a remote learning system.204 However, in other instances, where
the inventive contribution happens to also be the functional component, restricting
the functional component may be effective. One such example is Amazon's
"single click component," where restricting the functionality of the single click
claim to a particular algorithm, narrows the claim down from all potential single
click shopping applications to one specific implementation using cookies where
the user has previously logged in before using the single click.2 05
On the other extreme, the Federal Circuit may run the risk of over restricting
pioneering patents from the broader scope they deserve, such as in the case of
Wright's flying machine. 206 Under the Federal Circuit's application of § 112(f),
Wright's means for wing warping claim element would have been limited to the
specific rope pulley system and would not have covered human knowledge of
how to operate the wings. Chief Judge Hand properly appreciated the significance
of the inventive contribution, and thus awarded the claim the broader scope it
deserved for being a pioneering invention. 20 7 Thus, it is important for the Federal
Circuit to clearly understand and appreciate the significance of the inventive
contribution in order to properly limit the scope of the contribution.
204 Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir.2015).
205 U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (filed Sept. 12, 1997).
206 Wright Co. v. Herring-Curtiss Co., 211 F. 654 at 655 (awarding broader scope for
wing warping by construing means to control the rudder to extend beyond a rope-pulley
system described in the specification to a pilot having knowledge on how to fly the plane,
because he recognized the pioneering contribution of the invention).
207 Id.
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(b) The Danger with Determining Equivalents Without Understanding the
Alleged Invention
Without consideration of the overarching inventive contribution, the Federal
Circuit will also encounter difficulty in determining the equivalents of a particular
claim. Under the doctrine of equivalents, equivalence is determined if another
device or process performs substantially the same function, in substantially the
same way, to achieve the same result.20 8 However, without knowing the facts of
the inventive contribution, the Federal Circuit will not be able to consider
equivalence factors to determine equivalents of the overall inventive contribution.
The determination of equivalents is important because a large number of
equivalents signals that the claim is overbroad, whereas a small number of
equivalents indicates that the claim may be limited to particular implementations.
Without knowing what equivalent a claim would encompass, it will be difficult to
determine what scope to award a claim. Accordingly, it will be difficult to employ
Lemley's use of § 112(f) to effectively restrict claim scope.
While the doctrine of equivalence does not provide much help in light of the
Federal Circuit's approach, the reverse doctrine of equivalents, however, may
provide some guidance for restricting claim scope. The reverse doctrine of
equivalents functions much like § 112(f) in preventing the unwarranted extension
of claims beyond the intended scope of the inventive contribution. 209 Under this
doctrine, devices that perform the same function of the claim, but whose
substance lies outside the bounds of the specification, do not infringe. 2 10 For
208 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608-09 (1950).
209 Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co.,170 U.S. at 558.
210 Id. (finding non-infringement when the later air brake performed the same function
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example, a modem day smart phone would fall outside the scope of Morse's
claim for communication using electromagnetic means under the reverse doctrine
of equivalents, because it is such a drastically, substantial improvement over the
telegraph that it falls outside the scope covered by the claim.
The reverse doctrine of equivalents was meant to prevent pioneering claims
from covering future inventions that are beyond the scope of the intended
invention. 2 11 Because it is a powerful tool that wields the same restrictive effect as
§ 112(f) without the means-plus-function restrictions, the reverse doctrine of
equivalents may be used to protect inventions from infringing the thicket of patent
claims. 212 While the analysis of the reverse doctrine of equivalents is similar to
the Federal Circuit's approach to § 112(f), the doctrine is rarely used.2 13
The Federal Circuit has never affirmed a finding of non-infringement under
the reverse doctrine of equivalence. 2 14 Perhaps the Federal Circuit has rejected the
reverse doctrine of equivalence because it prefers a defined legal test to a
discretionary standard.2 15 However, if § 112(f) is to be used broadly to restrict
but radically improved Westinghouse's invention in one fell swoop).
211 Id.; see Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608-09.
212 Warner-Jenkinson v. Hilton David Chemical Co., 520, U.S. 17, 29 (1997); Tate
Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Resources, Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
213 Id. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1311.
214 Merges and Duffy, supra note 138, at 835.
215 Samuel F. Ernst, The Lost Precedent of the Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents, 18
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L., 501-502 (2016) (Forthcoming) (claiming that the Federal Circuit
may have avoided the reverse doctrine of equivalence because it is a discretionary policy
lever. The paper proposes transforming the reverse doctrine of equivalence into a three-step
legal test in order to make the Federal Circuit more likely to adopt it.).
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software functional claims, the Federal Circuit should consider bringing back the
reverse doctrine of equivalents as a legal test in order to extend the reach of
§ 112(f) to claims that are not drafted in means-plus-function form.
(c) § 112(f) Introduces a Second Layer of Claim Construction
As discussed earlier, § 112(f) comes with a rebuttable presumption that
§ 112(f) is not invoked if the inventor has not chosen to write the claim in means-
plus-function form. 2 16 In order to apply § 112(f) automatically to all software
claims without causing an additional layer of claim construction to determine
whether the claim is in fact a means-plus-function claim, the Federal Circuit will
need to provide specific guidance for software patents. Current case law has not
provided consistent guidance for determining which "nonce words" may trigger
§ 112(f). 2 17
The Apple court held in a recent case that "whether to draft a claim in broad
structural terms is the claim drafter's choice, and any resulting risk that emanates
from that choice is not a basis for a court to rewrite the claim in a means-plus-
function format." 2 18 In order to override the patentee's choice of claim drafting
format and avoid controversy, the Federal Circuit will need to reform how § 112(f)
is applied for software patents in order to invoke it automatically. Additionally, as
Lemley has acknowledged in his paper, the Federal Circuit will also need to
provide clear guidance for what constitutes sufficient disclosure of an algorithm
216 See supra Part I.B.
217 See Apple, 757 F.3d at 1299.
218 Id., at 1298.
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to satisfy the structure requirement of § 112(f).219
C. Reforms the Federal Circuit Must Consider to Effectively Use § 112(f) to
Restrict Claims
From the discussion in this section, it is clear that in order to overcome the
subjectivity and claim construction issues involved with § 112(f), the Federal
Circuit must reform its approach to § 112(f) and the doctrine of equivalents and
reverse doctrine of equivalents in order to use § 112(f) to restrict claims.
First, the Federal Circuit must incorporate an understanding of the inventive
contribution in order to appreciate the significance of the contribution and to
determine the proper claim scope. Particularly in weeding out bad patents pretrial
during claim construction, the Federal Circuit must consider underlying fact
findings, as in Teva, in order to evaluate the validity of inventive contribution. 220
Since claim construction is closely tied to the same underlying facts relating to
validity, it makes sense for courts to simultaneously consider nonobviousness
during claim construction.
Second, the Federal Circuit must reform its approach to § 112(f) to apply it
consistently to software patents. As a first step, it must address the rebuttable
presumption against § 112(f) by defining the nonce words that will trigger
§ 112(f). Without doing so, courts cannot consistently apply § 112(f) without
triggering significant litigation over the use of § 112(f). Next, the Federal Circuit
must change its interpretation of § 112(f) to restrict the claim as a whole, using its
knowledge of the inventive contribution, instead of restricting the claim on an
219 Lemley, supra note 2, at 961. See also Chien, supra note 22, at 9.
220 Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 U.S. at 835.
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element-by-element basis.
Third, the Federal Circuit must be able to determine equivalents in order to
properly determine claim scope. The Federal Circuit must either incorporate an
understanding of the inventive contribution to be able to utilize the doctrine of
equivalents or bring back the reverse doctrine of equivalents in conjunction with
its use of § 112(f) in order to determine claim scope. Without such reforms,
employing § 112(f) cannot realistically be used to restrict overbroad functional
claims to a narrower scope during claim construction.
CONCLUSION
Lemley's proposal to invoke § 112(f) to restrict software claims by treating
every functional element in the claim as a means-plus-function element is a good
start. However, given the complexity in determining the applicability of § 112(f)
and the difficulty in finding sufficient structural disclosure, this solution is
problematic.
This paper instead offers an alternate approach in using nonobviousness to
tackle the software problem in two phases. Prior to issuance, examiners should
utilize the nonobviousness doctrine to force patentees to amend overbroad
functional claims. 221 Curing overbroad functional claims prior to issuance will
save further efforts down the road where overcoming the validity of an issued
patent is much more expensive. 222 Post grant, courts may integrate the
221 See Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 514 F.3d at 1254 (holding that substituting broad
language at the point of novelty does not provide sufficient notice of what the patentee was
removing from the public");
222 See Microsoft Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 2242 (establishing that issued patents have a strong
presumption of validity).
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determination of validity using nonobviousness during Markman hearings.
However, in order to facilitate this, the Federal Circuit will need to consider
reforms that allow courts to consider the inventive contribution during claim
construction. Doing so will not only allow courts to apply the nonobvious
doctrine to determine validity, but also enable courts to properly determine claim
scope. Even if Lemley's approach is used to invalidate claims prior to trial, courts
must still understand the inventive contribution in order to invoke the statute as
Lemley intended to tackle overbroad software patents.
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APPENDIX I
U.S. Patent No. 5,930, 474: Internet organizer for accessing geographically
and topically based information
A. Functional Claim 223
26. A system for organizing on-line information into geographically-based
areas, said system comprising
a user computer for accessing information in a computer network; and
organizer means for processing requests received from said user
computer, said organizer comprising:
a database of information organized into a predefined hierarchy of
geographical areas, wherein entries corresponding to each of said
geographical areas is further organized into topics; and
search engine means for selecting one of said geographical areas
wherein at least one of said entries associated with a broader
geographical area is dynamically replicated into a narrower
geographical area, said search engine means also comprising
means for searching said topics associated with said geographical
search area.
223 U.S. Patent No. 5,930,474 at col. 40, lines 10-27.
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B. Functional Abstraction
Describing how the web server provides a user with useful information
relating to an out-of-print book in Los Angeles. 224
In accordance with the teachings of the preferred
emboliment, thc web organizer server 114, together with
other like servrs in communication with the 1thernt link
110 (i.e., in communication with the laternet access
provider), provides subscribing users with a geographically
organized perspetive of the information available by
accessing the Internet Thus, if a user is i nterested in tinding
an ut-of-print book, or a good price on his favorite bottlU
of wine, but does not want to travel outsid of the Los
Angeles area to acquire these goods, then the user can
simply lesignate the Los Angeles area as a eographic
k athon for which a topicl search is to be perrioned. In this
exampeI, the Los Angeles area delLs a gcog aphical sctarc
area, wherein the geographical search area is dcfined as a
area from which topical information can be accessed, and
wlich is a subset of the entire domain of geographic areas
which can be searlched for topical information. Thus, the
geo graph ic opI rrganizati n formal provided in accor-
danc with the preferred embodimienr provides hi user with
a valuahic laternet organizing tool, srncc current Internet
search techniques might allow the user to find the inform-
tlion which he is interesed in, but at an undesirable location
so that [ibc user may he required Lo scarch for hours in order
to find the goods or sLrvkcs in whic hh is interested at the
appropriate geographic areas.
224 Id. at col. 7, lines 5-29 (Functional abstraction describing the goal of providing
information to services in a particular location in text).
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C. Abstract Data Type
Illustrated as databases organizing infonnation, i.e., Yellow Pages Database. 225
/ NAME , PARTIO
N FORM AIN
Z.-k ENT fh
MI l . N.V 1
NO'
F/C 2C
225 Id. at Fig. 2C (Abstract data types illustrated as databases organizing information); Id.
at col. 12, lines 33-45 (Pseudo code).
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Pseudo Code
Describing how to utilize the fourth parameter to determine how to return a
particular entry by search.
The fourth parametr, signified by the letter m, is an
integer number that represents the number of entries to skip.
This parameter may be used by the Read subroutine 320
whenever there are more than 50 entries in a list and
scrulling is to bc supporicd. Ina proforred mbodimcn, the
firs search has this value always entred as zero, and
subsequent scroll searches increment this value to support
scrolling. Finaily, the Name Key parameter indicates the
name of the foler to display. As used herein, a folder is
defined as a list of entries designated by a single name an rd
ccessible by that singlk name. Any entry whose pareni
folder name matches the name specified will be returned by
tbe search.
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D. Data Structure
Showing a record with various information 226
70'.A
1-T40~
226 Id. at Fig. 13 (Data structure disclosing a record in the database); Id. at Table 1-2
(Html source code).
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